14 September 2016

Junk Publishing and Pseudolegalism

A small moment of cheer for scholars disquieted by email from junk publishers, with news last month that the US Federal Trade Commission  charged OMICS Group, Inc. (along with two affiliated companies and executive Srinubabu Gedela) with deceiving academics and researchers about the nature of its publications and hiding publication fees ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars.

The FTC’s complaint alleges that the OMICS group - publisher of what the FTC characterises as "hundreds of purported online academic journals" - claim that
their journals follow rigorous peer-review practices and have editorial boards made up of prominent academics. In reality, many articles are published with little to no peer review and numerous individuals represented to be editors have not agreed to be affiliated with the journals.
According to the FTC’s complaint, OMICS does not tell researchers that they must pay significant publishing fees until after it has accepted an article for publication, and often will not allow researchers to withdraw their articles from submission, thereby making the research ineligible for publication in another journal. Academic ethics standards generally forbid researchers from submitting the same research to more than one journal.
“The defendants in this case used false promises to convince researchers to submit articles presenting work that may have taken months or years to complete, and then held that work hostage over undisclosed publication fees ranging into the thousands of dollars,” said Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “It is vital that we stop scammers who seek to take advantage of the changing landscape of academic publishing.”
Among the deceptive statements OMICS made to researchers, according to the complaint, were descriptions of its journals as having a high “impact factor,” a term that describes approximately how frequently articles in a particular journal are cited in other research. Thomson Reuters’ proprietary measure of journals’ impact factors is the widely accepted standard, but OMICS allegedly calculated its own impact scores and did not clearly disclose that fact to consumers.
The defendants also tell researchers that their journals are indexed by federal research databases, including the National Institutes of Health’s PubMed and MEDLINE services, when in fact that is not true, according to the complaint.
In addition to misrepresentations related to their journal publishing services, the FTC’s complaint alleges that the defendants regularly deceive consumers while promoting academic conferences they organize. The defendants allegedly include the names of prominent researchers as participants and presenters at the conferences, which charge registration fees that can cost more than $1,000, when in fact many of those researchers often did not agree to participate in the events.
The FTC’s complaint charges the defendants, OMICS Group Inc., iMedPub LLC, Conference Series LLC, and Srinubabu Gedela, with multiple violations of the FTC Act’s prohibition on deceptive acts or practices.

There's another perspective in Ennis v Credit Union Australia [2016] FCCA 1705. 

Jarrett J states 

The respondent suggests that the applicant has pursued these proceedings by seeking to engage an argument which has found some favour with persons who are seeking to avoid payment of their debts, around the world really, but principally in the United States, Canada and Australia. The argument is described in the material as an “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and there are, as the respondents submissions point out, a number of hallmarks to that type of approach which are present in the current case. 

The relevant approach has been described in other cases – and I do not intend in these reasons to go through chapter and verse what that argument entails other than to say that it has been the subject of scholarly explanation in a decision from Canada called Meads v Meads (2012) ABQB 571. The argument and the approach is flawed and cannot succeed for the reasons explained in Mead v Mead

In this application, although Ms Ennis disavows any knowledge of the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” she does, nonetheless, seek to rely on a case which tends to suggest that she is, in fact, relying on the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument”. 

The case concerned is a decision from a United States court in Minnesota. That decision, First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Dec. 9, 1968 (Justice Court, Credit River Township, Scott County, Minnesota), also known as the Credit River Case was a case where a Justice of the Peace in a court in Minnesota determined that the U.S. Federal Reserve Act was unconstitutional and void; determined that the U.S. National Banking Act was unconstitutional and void and declared a mortgage acquired by the First National Bank of Montgomery, Minnesota in the regular course of its business, along with the foreclosure and a sheriff's sale to be void. The respondent, who was being pursued by his bank for recovery of land that was used as security for a loan, was successful in avoiding having to repay the debt and by the decision was able to keep his land. 

In her materials Ms Ennis suggests that that case is somehow important here; she suggests that the decision has survived an appeal because an appeal was made out of time and dismissed and that the decision should bind me. But none of that is correct. The decision has no importance here for a number of reasons. First, it is a decision of a very minor court in the United States given in 1968. It has no precedent value here. It is not even part of the same court system. Secondly, the decision in that court was “voided” in 1969 by a subsequent decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court: see Zurn v Northwestern National Bank 284 Minn. 573, 170 N.W.2d 600 (1969). 

The same thing happened in another case also involving Mr Daley, as it turns out, Daly v Savage State Bank 285 Minn. 503, 171 N.W.2d 218 (1969). Sadly for Mr Daly, who was a lawyer, following those decisions he was disbarred as a direct result of the arguments in those cases: In re Jerome Daly 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d 176 (1971). 

There has also been an erudite discussion of these types of matters in a case called Tuttle v. Chase Home Finance, LLC et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Oct. 26, 2008, case no. 2:08-CV-574-DB. 

So enough said about the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and the cases upon which it might be founded. ...